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The containment of epidemic spreading is a major challenge in science. Vaccination, whenever
available, is the best way to prevent the spreading, because it eventually immunizes individuals.
However, vaccines are not perfect, and total immunization is not guaranteed. Imperfect immuniza-
tion has driven the emergence of anti-vaccine movements that totally alter the predictions about
the epidemic incidence. Here, we propose a mathematically solvable mean-field vaccination model
to mimic the spontaneous adoption of vaccines against influenza-like diseases, and the expected
epidemic incidence. The results are in agreement with extensive Monte Carlo simulations of the epi-
demics and vaccination co-evolutionary processes. Interestingly, the results reveal a non-monotonic
behavior on the vaccination coverage, that increases with the imperfection of the vaccine and af-
ter decreases. This apparent counterintuitive behavior is analyzed and understood from stability
principles of the proposed mathematical model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantitative study of diseases propagation has
captured the attention of statistical physicists since long
[1–3]. Specifically, this approach has shed light on many
conundrums by considering the networked structure of
contacts, their time-varying and multi-layer character,
as well as the recurrent nature of mobility patterns [4–8].
Vaccination, whenever possible, is the most effective
way to harness and prevent the spreading of a disease
[9]. Under normal circumstances, the decision of getting
vaccinated can be considered as an act of cooperation,
since it bestows benefits on the whole population at
the expenses of single individuals. Notwithstanding,
we are recently witnessing the emergence of widespread
anti-vaccine movements, which are mainly fueled by
misconceptions and mischievous news about vaccines
[10–16]. Scientists (including physicists) are devoting
tremendous efforts in designing efficient immunization
strategies [17] as well as shedding light on the mech-
anisms behind the deliberate decision of not getting
vaccinated and their harmful consequences [18, 19].
Vaccination can be modeled as a strategy of a game.
Under such premises, the evolution of vaccines’ voluntary
adoption can be investigated using the machinery of
game theory [20, 21] and statistical physics [22, 23].
The first studies carried out on vaccination games
use classical game theory, with single round games in
which agents have perfect knowledge of their odds to
get infected [24, 25]. In reality, however, individuals
are not perfectly aware of the risk to get infected, and
vaccination coverage may evolve in time as byproduct of
personal experiences or imitation. Therefore, evolution-
ary game theory is the natural workbench to tackle the
problem. The seminal works in this direction assumed
the simultaneous evolution of vaccination and spreading
dynamics [26–28]. A different approach was used in
the case of seasonal influenza, by considering that the
spreading process reaches its stationary state before
vaccination games take place [29–32].
Here, we introduce a mean-field framework to mimic
the spontaneous adoption of vaccines against influenza-
like diseases. Our model captures the essence of previous
approaches to gauge, analytically, the risk of epidemic
outbreaks. In particular, we use a minimal evolutionary
vaccination game to infer the strategies adopted before
an epidemic season. This, in turns, allows us to estimate
the risk of future outbreaks by encapsulating agents’
strategies into an epidemic model. We get analytical
results and insightful conclusions from the analysis
of this framework in well-mixed populations. More
specifically, we unveil how the interplay between the
probability of infection, vaccine effectiveness, and cost,
gives rise to non-linear responses in vaccine uptake.
Our analysis reveals a non-monotonic behavior on the
vaccination coverage which, surprisingly, increases as
the vaccine quality deteriorates. Such counterintuitive
behavior is analyzed and understood from stability
principles of the proposed mathematical model.
II. THE MODEL
Let us consider a well-mixed population of N
agents/individuals. We asume that this population
has initially undergone a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
(SIR) disease spreading [2, 3]. To stay simple and keep
the problem still analytically solvable, we set the disease
incidence in such previous season equal to α. Such quan-
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2tity is an input parameter of the model and acts as a
proxy for the perception of infection risk, e.g. advised
through the mass-media. After the first outbreak, the
vaccination dynamics takes place. As a result, agents
converge to the decision of vaccinating (V ) or not (NV ).
The resulting strategy is the outcome of the evolution-
ary dynamics (see below) given the previous incidence,
α, infection probability, β, recovery cost, T , the cost of
the vaccine, c, and its failure rate γ or, equivalently, its
effectiveness (1 − γ). The corresponding vaccine cover-
age – given by the fraction of vaccinated agents yeq – is
used as the input of a new SIR spreading process, hav-
ing the same β and T . The results of the SIR dynamics
allow us to estimate the total infection incidence, R∞,
as a function of the relevant parameters, especially α.
The mathematical definition of α is the probability of
infection, in the previous outbreak, of an agent without
protection against the disease.
Vaccination dynamics consists of a repeatedly played
two strategy game, in which agents either take the vac-
cine (s = V ) or not (s = NV ). Agents will decide accord-
ing to: (i) the cost associated to uptaking the vaccine (c)
and (ii) the recovery cost (T ) weighted by the perceived
risk of getting infected by a contact in a future outbreak.
The latter risk depends on the previous incidence α, the
infection rate β, and the vaccine effectivenesss (1 − γ).
It is worth stressing that the vaccination cost should not
be seen purely as a financial one. It also includes for ex-
ample vaccine hesitancy [11, 12]. The payoffs associated
to each of the four possible encounters between pairs of
agents are: 
PV→ V = −c− γ2βαT
PV→ NV = −c− γβαT
PNV→ V = −γβαT
PNV→ NV = −βαT
. (1)
Where Ps1→s2 is the payoff accumulated by an agent with
strategy s1 when it meets another having strategy s2
(s1, s2 ∈ {V,NV }). As explained above, the prefactors
of the recovery cost (T ) in Eq.(1) are modulated by the
perceived risk of infection given the previous outbreak,
encapsulated in α, and the probability that an individ-
ual playing with strategy s1 is infected by another with
strategy s2.
The fitness of an agent i, pii, is defined as the sum
of payoffs accumulated across its pairwise interactions.
Every agent i with strategy si chooses randomly another
one j, with strategy sj , compares their fitness (pii, pij)
and if pij > pii adopts j’s strategy with probability:
Γsj→si =
pij − pii
max
∀sa,sb,sc,sd∈{V,NV }
(Psa→sb − Psc→sd)
. (2)
The strategies of the agents are updated synchronously
after each round of the game. Using the above update
function, and assuming that agents are well-mixed, the
mean outcome of the individual decisions follows the so-
called replicator equation [20]:
y˙ = y
(
〈piV 〉 − 〈pi〉
)
, (3)
where y is the fraction of vaccinated agents, 〈piV 〉 the
average payoff of a vaccinated agent, and 〈pi〉 the average
payoff of the population. According to the payoffs in
Eq.(1), the replicator equation reads:
y˙ = −y(1− y)
{
c− βαT (1− γ)
[
1− (1− γ)y
]}
. (4)
The above equation admits two trivial equilibrium points
(yeq = 0 and yeq = 1), and a third, nontrivial, one:
y∗ =
1
1− γ
[
1− c
βTα(1− γ)
]
. (5)
The criteria for the existence of the non trivial equi-
librium point have an intuitive interpretation. In fact,
the condition y∗ > 0 is equivalent to PNV→ NV <
PV→ NV, which translates into a vaccination threshold
β˜ = c/αT (1 − γ). In other words, it is impossible
to observe vaccination in a system where c > T , i.e.
where vaccinating costs more than recovery. The crite-
rion y∗ < 1 translates into PV→ V < PNV→ V, correspond-
ing to β < β˜/γ. If this condition is not fulfilled, a vac-
cinated agent has a higher payoff than a non vaccinated
one regardless of the opponents strategies, hence leading
to full vaccination. In the next section, we analyze the
stability of the equilibrium points.
A. Stability analysis of the model
The evolution of y is ruled by Eq. (4). To analyze
the stability of its fixed points, we need to evaluate the
derivatives of the selection gradient, F (y), corresponding
to the RHS of Eq. (4):
dF (y)
dy
= −(1− 2y)
{
c− βαT (1− γ)
[
1− (1− γ)y
]}
− y(1− y)βαT (1− γ)2. (6)
Evaluating the derivative at the internal fixed point, y∗,
we get:
dF (y)
dy
∣∣∣
y=y∗
= −y∗(1− y∗)βαT (1− γ)2. (7)
If the internal fixed point lies in (0 < y∗ < 1), it is stable,
since dF (y)dy
∣∣∣
y=y∗
< 0. Otherwise, if (y∗ < 0) or (y∗ > 1),
the fixed point y∗ is unstable. Evaluating the derivative
at the monomorphic states (yeq = 0 and yeq = 1), we get:
dF (y)
dy
∣∣∣
y=0
= βαT (1− γ)− c = PV → NV − PNV → NV
dF (y)
dy
∣∣∣
y=1
= c− βαT (1− γ)γ = PNV → V − PV → V
.
(8)
3Consequently, the derivative evaluated at the
monomorphic states corresponds to the existence cri-
teria y∗ > 0 and y∗ < 1, respectively. Therefore, the
monomorphic states are unstable in the presence of the
internal fixed point, y∗, and reach stability depending on
wheter y∗ < 0 or y∗ > 1. These findings are summarized
in Fig. 1, which presents the selection gradient as a
function of the vaccination coverage, y, in the presence
of the internal fixed point, y∗. One can see that y∗ is
stable and as the internal fixed point is shifted to y∗ = 0
or y∗ = 1, the corresponding monomorphic state reaches
stability.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
y
0
y˙
Monomorphic states
Internal fixed point
FIG. 1. Selection gradient, y˙ = F(y), as a function of the
vaccination coverage, y. The parameters are set to c = 0.1,
α = 0.3, β = 0.55, γ = 0.1, and T = 1.0.
Therefore, the vaccination coverage, yeq, being defined
by the stable equilibrium point, is given by the internal
fixed point yeq = y
∗ for β˜ ≤ β ≤ β˜/γ, whereas for β <
β˜ and β˜/γ < β it is given by yeq = 0 and yeq = 1,
respectively.
B. Interpretation of results
According to Eq. (5), high values of c are detrimen-
tal for vaccination, while high values of T and β boosts
it. Additionally, the vaccination coverage depends ex-
clusively on the ratio between vaccination and recovery
costs, which we denote as f = c/T . Therefore, consider-
ing Eq. (5), one can see that full vaccination cannot be
stable for a perfect vaccine unless f = 0.
More subtle is the dependence on the vaccination qual-
ity γ. In fact, lowering vaccine quality increases vaccine
coverage (dy∗/dγ > 0) if the fraction of effectively vacci-
nated agents yeff > 0.5, where yeff = (1− γ)y. Notewor-
thy, albeit the quality of the vaccine worsens, agents will
choose more often to vaccinate.
At first glance, the increase in vaccine uptake as its
effectiveness decrease may seem counterintuitive. The
rationale behind this is as follows: as γ increases there is
a competition between the increasing risk of getting in-
fected and the reduced protection bestowed by the vac-
cine itself, as shown in Fig. 2. To shed light on such
competition, one may look at the decrease of the vac-
cine’s effectiveness 1−γ as a dynamical process. As effec-
tiveness decreases, the risk for a not vaccinated agent of
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FIG. 2. Vaccination coverage at equilibrium, y∗, as a function
of effectiveness, 1− γ for two different values of the infection
probability β. The dashed line indicates the fraction of effec-
tively vaccinated agents. The other parameters are α = 0.4,
c = 0.1, and T = 1.0. The maximum coverage y∗max is de-
noted by a point, and the dotted line delimits the tolerance
range. The inset displays the value of the maximum coverage
y∗max given in Eq. (10) as a function of infectivity β. The color
highlights the region where vaccination takes place or not.
getting infected by a previously vaccinated one becomes
yeff × βαγ. Conversely, the risk of a vaccinated agent to
get infected by a non vaccinated becomes (1−yeff)×βαγ.
Comparing these two risks, the vaccinated agent has an
advantage over the non vaccinated if yeff > (1 − yeff),
which translates into yeff > 0.5. Hence, the counterintu-
itive act of vaccinating when the efficiency of the vaccine
is low, turns out to be a rational decision to mitigate the
infection pressure. Moreover, the existence – for each in-
fectivity β – of a maximum fraction of vaccinated agents,
y∗max, delimitates a region of “tolerable effectiveness” be-
yond which agents decide to non vaccinate. Also, the po-
sition of y∗max versus β splits the phase space into two dis-
tinct regions (Fig. 2 inset). Interestingly, this effect has
been observed previously in other coevolutionary models
[31–33], but never explained hitherto. At variance with
y, the fraction of effectively vaccinated agents, yeff, is al-
ways lowered by a decrease of the vaccine quality, i.e.
d((1−γ)y∗)
dγ < 0. Therefore, the higher vaccination cov-
erage is not counterbalancing the lower vaccine quality.
Let us analyze this dependency more in detail.
C. Dependence of the vaccination uptake on
vaccine quality
There are three different regimes regarding the depen-
dency of the vaccination coverage, yeq, on γ. The first
one is the absence of vaccination independently of γ, cor-
responding to β < cαT =
f
α . In the second regime y
∗(γ =
40) < 0.5 the vaccination coverage is monotonously de-
creasing with γ. Therefore, maximal vaccination cover-
age is reached for a perfect vaccine γ = 0. The con-
dition y∗(γ = 0) < 0.5 is equivalent to β ≤ 2fα . In
the third regime β > 2fα , the dependence of y∗ on γ is
non monotonous, wherefore the vaccination coverage is
maximal for a non perfect vaccine. The vaccine quality
maximizing the vaccination coverage is then found from
dy∗/dγ = 0, giving:
γc = 1− 2f
βα
. (9)
The vaccine quality maximizing the vaccination cover-
age can also be seen as a tolerance threshold. If 1 − γ
becomes worse than 1 − γc, agents start refusing taking
the vaccine and the vaccination coverage drops rapidly,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. From there, the maximal vacci-
nation coverage in the three regimes is then given by:
y∗max = 0 if β ≤ fα
y∗max = 1− fβα if fα < β ≤ 2fα
y∗max =
βα
4f if
2f
α ≤ β .
(10)
The maximal vaccination coverage, y∗max, as a function
of β is presented, instead, in the inset of Fig. 3.
III. IMPACT OF VACCINATION ON THE
EPIDEMIC SPREADING
After discussing the outcome of the vaccination dy-
namics, we now turn our focus towards its impact on the
subsequent epidemic outbreak. Assuming that the vac-
cination dynamics always ends up in the unique stable
equilibrium point, yeq; we can use such information to
compute the extent of a future epidemic outbreak by us-
ing a SIR compartmental model [3]. The dynamics of the
SIR model is then given by:
S˙ = −βIS
I˙ = βIS − µI
R˙ = µI
, (11)
where S, I, and R denote the fraction of susceptible,
infected, and recovered agents, respectively. The afore-
mentioned quantities fulfill the conservation law
S + I + R + (1 − γ)yeq = 1. Note that µ = 1/T in-
dicates the recovery probability in agreement with the
vaccination game. The fraction of recovered agents af-
ter the epidemics dies out, R∞, is given by the following
trascendental equation:
R∞ = 1−(1−γ)yeq−
[
1−(1−γ)yeq−I0
]
e−
β
µ R∞ , (12)
where I0 is the initial fraction of infected agents. Eq. (12)
has no analytical solution, hence it must be solved numer-
ically. Nevertheless, in an infinite size system (N →∞),
the term I0 can be neglected since I0  1. Thus, a non
negligible fraction of recovered agents, R∞, exists if:
β >
µ
1− (1− γ)yeq = βc , (13)
where βc denotes the epidemic threshold. As expected,
if the system displays no vaccination, yeq = 0, and the
above criteria reduces to the purely epidemic SIR thresh-
old βc = µ. Instead, for the full vaccination case, yeq = 1,
the criteria becomes βc = µ/γ. Finally, for the internal
fixed point, yeq = y
∗, the existence of R∞ > 0 in Eq.(12)
implies:
f
µα(1− γ) > 1 . (14)
Surprisingly, this condition is independent of β. There-
fore, the increased vaccination coverage balances the in-
creased transmission probability in the subsequent epi-
demic outbreak.
In Fig. 3, we display the vaccination coverage, yeq
(panel a), and the fraction of recovered agents, R∞ (panel
b), as a function of the previous season incidence α, and
the probability of infection β in the case of a perfect vac-
cine (γ = 0). As expected, a remarkably high fraction
of recovered agents is observed for a highly infective epi-
demic (large β) paired with a small fraction of infected
agents in the previous outbreak (small α). In (panel b),
one can observe that, given a value of α, the fraction
of recovered individuals is maximal at the vaccination
threshold β˜. A way of finding the maxima and minima
of the fraction of recovered agents, R∞, is considering its
derivative with respect to the tranmission probability, β,
dR∞
dβ . Note that in an infinite system, the transcendental
equation Eq. (12) takes three different forms depending
on the vaccination coverage:
R∞ = 1− e−
β
µR∞ if µ < β ≤ β˜
R∞ = β˜β
(
1− e− βµR∞
)
if β˜ < β ≤ β˜γ
R∞ = γ
(
1− e− βµR∞
)
if β˜γ < β ≤ 1
. (15)
In order to find an explicit expression for dR∞dβ , we
derive both sides of Eq. (15) and subsequently rearrange
terms, which leads to:
dR∞
dβ
=
R∞
µ
(
e
β
µR∞ − β
µ
) , if µ < β ≤ β˜
dR∞
dβ
=
R∞ +
µ
β
(
1− e βµR∞
)
µβ
β˜
(
e
β
µR∞ − β˜
µ
) , if β˜ < β ≤ β˜γ
dR∞
dβ
=
R∞γ
µ
(
e
β
µR∞ − γ β
µ
) , if β˜γ < β ≤ 1 .
(16)
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FIG. 3. Vaccination coverage, yeq, (panel a) and fraction of recovered individuals, R∞, (panel b) as a function of disease
incidence in the previous season, α, and infection probability, β. The red solid line corresponds to the vaccination threshold, β˜,
separating the region where no vaccine uptake occurs from the one where nonzero vaccination could be observed. In (panel b),
the white solid lines correspond to the epidemic thresholds in the absence of (β = 0.2), and in presence (α = 0.5) of vaccination
according to Eq. (13). The other variables are fixed to c = 0.1, T = 1.0, γ = 0.1 and µ = 0.2. (panel c) R∞ as a function of β
for different costs of the vaccine, c. The inset presents the vaccination coverage, yeq. Additionally, the critical values of β are
presented following Eq.(15) such as the purely epidemic threshold, βc, the vaccination threshold, β˜, and the threshold for full
vaccination, β˜/γ. The remaining variables are fixed to T = 1.0, γ = 0.4, α = 0.4 and µ = 0.1.
To infer information about the sign of dR∞dβ we need to
bound R∞. By using again Eq. (15) and the inequality
1−e−x> x1+x , we find a lower bound for R∞ as:
R∞ > 1− µβ , if µ < β ≤ β˜
R∞ > β˜β − µβ , if β˜ < β ≤ β˜γ
R∞ > γ − µβ , if β˜γ < β ≤ 1 .
(17)
These lower bounds can then be combined with the
inequality e
λ
µR∞ ≥ 1 + λµR∞. The strict inequality holds
for all R∞ > 0. This enables us to develop the expres-
sions for the derivative in Eq. (16), leading to:
dR∞
dβ > 0 , if µ < β ≤ β˜
dR∞
dβ < 0 , if β˜ < β ≤ β˜γ
dR∞
dβ > 0 , if
β˜
γ < β ≤ 1 .
(18)
The cases β < β˜ and β˜γ < β are as expected. In these
regimes the vaccination coverage does not vary with β
(yeq = 0 and yeq = 1, respectively), wherefore R∞ in-
creases monotonously with β. In the intermediate regime
β˜ < β < β˜/γ though, where yeq = y
∗, R∞ monotonously
decreases with β (dR∞dβ < 0). Consequently, vaccina-
tion emerges in a way such that it outweighs the in-
creased transmission probability and hinders the epi-
demic spreading, as illustrated in Fig.3c. From these
considerations, we can conclude that the fraction of re-
covered agents is locally maximal at β = β˜, and locally
minimal at β = β˜/γ. The numerical exploration of the
parameter space has confirmed hitherto that the former
is also a global maximum. Moreover, the highest frac-
tion of recovered, Rmax∞ , for a fully vaccinated popula-
tion (yeq = 1) would correspond to meaningless values
of the parameters. Depending on the parameters, the
system will not be in all of the three regimes presented
in Eq. (18) as the transmission probability, β, is varied.
If the parameters are such that β˜/γ > 1, the system
will never fall in the third regime. Consequently, R∞
monotonously decreases once vaccination emerges. Sim-
ilarly, one might have β˜ > 1 for which the system shows
no vaccination and R∞ monotonously increases with β.
The different cases are illustrated in Fig.3c.
A. Numerical simulations
To validate that the previous equations are actually
describing the behavior of the considered system, we
have compared the analytical results discussed above
with those obtained via Monte Carlo simulations. The
simulations have been made for a system of N = 1000
agents updating their strategy accordingly to Eq. (2),
and averaged over Nreal = 50 realizations. The differ-
ence between theory and the simulation for the vaccine
coverage, y, and fraction of infected agents, R∞, is
plotted in panels a and b of Fig. 4. The maximal
differences for y and R∞ are around 0.2% and 2.5%,
respectively. The average relative errors, instead, are
0.2% for y and 2.0% for R∞. The agreement between
analytical and numerical simulations, σ, is thus ∼ 2%.
We want to remark also that preliminary analysis
made in the case of discrete interactions encoded as
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FIG. 4. Differences between the quantities computed using
Monte Carlo simulations and their analytical counterparts as
a function of parameters α and β. Panel a presents the case
of yeq, while panel b the case of R∞, instead. The other
parameters are set to N = 1000, γ = 0.1, µ = 0.2, and
T = 1.0, respectively.
networks showed similar results, although we lack an
analytical solution. Notwithstanding, the well-mixed
population proves to be a good approximation for the
vaccination dynamics on networks. This is very likely
due to the vaccination cost term in the total payoff,
which does not scale with the degree of nodes. Addi-
tionally, the nontrivial increase in vaccine uptake – as
effectiveness decreases – is also observed in simulations
on networked populations [31].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Summing up, we have presented a mean-field model
to predict vaccine uptake for influenza-like diseases using
the disease incidence during previous outbreak season as
a proxy for the “perception of infection risk.” The model
predicts the existence of a tolerance range of vaccine
effectiveness, where a nontrivial increase in vaccination
coverage takes place as the vaccine inefficiency increases.
Albeit appearing irrational and counterintuitive at first
sight, such behavior is – instead – due to the interplay
between the vaccination game and the disease spreading
processes. The model predicts also that highly infective
– but under control – epidemics might prove dangerous
for future infections, since they alter the “risk percep-
tion” of the agents, and induce them to non vaccination.
Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, the time scale
between the two dynamics (decision and spreading) has
always been considered fixed. The sole exception, up to
our knowledge, are childhood diseases with long term im-
munity [27, 34]. The framework presented here could be
used to fill the gap among different model formulations
and unify them.
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